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INTRODUCTION

In 1991 the Workplace Fairness Act' was passed by the House
of Representatives,' but subsequently failed in the Senate3 in June
of 1992 because the majority supporters of the bill could not muster
the two-thirds vote required to overcome a filibuster by the minority
. Republican opposition. 4 The legislati6n, which the Bush Administra1. H.R. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 55, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
2. H.R. 5 passed on July 17, 1991, by a margin of 247-182. House Passes Striker
Replacement Bill but FallsShort of a Veto-ProofMajority, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 138,
at A-11 (July 18, 1991), availablein LFXIS, BNA Library, DLABRT File.
3. The bill considered in the Senate was numbered S. 55. S. 55, supra note 1. Section
1 of the bill is entitled "Prevention of Discrimination During and at the Conclusion of Labor Disputes," and it would amend § 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988), by making the following employer activity an unfair labor
practice (ULP):
(6) to promise, to threaten, or take other action (i) to hire a permanent replacement for an employee who (A) at the commencement of a labor dispute was an employee of the
employer in a bargaining unit in which a labor organization was the
certified or recognized exclusive representative or, on the basis of
written authorizations by a majority of the unit employees, was seeking to be so certified or recognized; and
(B) in connection with that dispute has engaged in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection through that labor organization; or
(ii) to withhold or deny any other employment right or privilege to an employee, who meets the criteria of subparagraph (A) and (B) of clause (i) and
who is working for or has unconditionally offered to return to work for the
employer, out of a preference for any other individual that is based on the
fact that the individual is performing, has performed, or has indicated a
willingness to perform bargaining unit work for the employer during the
labor dispute.
S. 55, supra note 1, § 1. Section 2 of S.55, entitled "Prevention of Discrimination During
and at the Conclusion of Railway Labor Disputes," would similarly amend the Railway
Labor Act of 1926, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152-217.
While non-union employees are included within the protections of the NLRA, NLRB
v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962), S. 55 conspicuously excluded non-union workers from its provisions, S.55, supra note 1, at § 1(2). This most likely reflects a
compromise to opponents of the Workplace Fairness Act who were concerned that the
proposed legislation would apply to non-union workers. See ProhibitingDiscrimination
Against Economic Strikers: Hearingson S. 55 Before the Subcomm. on Laborof the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 195, 200 (1991)
[hereinafter Labor Comm. Hearings].But see id. at 189 (statement of Professor Weiler arguing that the legislation would not apply to non-union companies).
4. Senate Vote Kills Bill to Restrict Use of PermanentStriker Replacements, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 117, at A-9 (June 17, 1992), available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
DLABRT File [hereinafter Senate Vote Kills Bill]. Senate Republicans led a filibuster that
prevented the bill from being brought to the floor for a vote. Id. A motion for cloture ending a filibuster requires a two-thirds vote in order to pass. Since the vote count was 57 to
42, the motion for cloture did not pass, and the bill was effectively killed. Id. Proponents
of the bill in the Senate vowed to continue pressing for passage of the legislation. Id.
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tion would have vetoed even if it had passed both houses of Congress, 5 is designed to overturn the 1938 Supreme Court dictum in
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.6 The dictum in Mackay
sanctions management's prerogative to permanently replace striking workers.
In an attempt to end the filibuster, Bob Packwood, a Republican Senator from
Oregon, introduced a compromise amendment, to the Workplace Fairness Act. Statements
and Summaries of Amendment to S. 55, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 114, at E-1 (June 12,
1992). His proposal qualified the Workplace Fairness Act's absolute ban on permanent
replacements. The Packwood Amendment provided that, before engaging in a strike, the
union must provide seven days' notice to both the employer and the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service (FMCS), indicating that the union consents to the formation of a
fact-finding mediation panel composed of three members. Id. If the employer rejects the
union's request, the union is allowed to strike and the employer is prohibited from hiring
permanent rejlacements. Id. However, if the union fails to give the requisite notice before
striking, the employer is permitted to hire permanent replacements. Id.
The proposed amendment also provided that if, following the union's seven-day
notice, the employer agrees to the formation of a three member mediation panel, labor
and management would then proceed to independently choose one panelist each; the third
panelist would be chosen with the acquiescence of both labor and management. Id. The
panel would investigate the economic circumstances underlying the dispute and conduct
hearings listening to arguments from both sides. Id. During the pendency of the panel's
investigation the status quo would be maintained: (1) the current collective bargaining
agreement would continue in effect for 45 days; (2) the union would be prohibited from
striking;, and (3) management would be prohibited from hiring permanent replacements.
Id.
Senator Packwood's proposal also called for the mediation panel to propose and
recommend a settlement at the conclusion of its investigation. Id. If the union accepts and
the employer rejects a recommendation, the union may strike and the employer could not
hire permanent replacements. Id. However, if the union rejects a panel recommendation
and strikes, the employer could permanently replace strikers, irrespective of whether the
employer rejected or accepted the panel's recommendation. Id.
Lobbyists for employers opposed the Packwood Amendment, while the A.F.L.-C.I.O.
supported it. Business Representatives Oppose Packwood Amendment to Striker Bill,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 116, at A-12 (June 16, 1992), available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, DLABRT File.. The Packwood Amendment failed to resolve the conflict over the
Workplace Fairness Act, and the filibuster effectively killed the bill. Senate Vote Kills
Bill, supra, at A-9.
5. Veto of Striker Replacement Bill Threatened by Bush Administration, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No.45, at A-8 (Mar. 7, 1991), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, DLABRT File.
Labor Secretary Lynn Martin told Congress that, if the Senate passes S.55, "President
Bush's senior advisors would recommend that he veto [the] legislation prohibiting the
permanent replacement of workers who participate in an economic strike." Id.
Significantly, President-Elect Bill Clinton supports passage of the Workplace Fairness
Act. Unions Unite Behind Clinton as the Best Choice for Labor, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
134, at C-1 (July 13, 1992), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, DLABRT File. Moreover,
Vice-President-Elect Albert Gore was among the 57 Senators voting in favor of the motion
for cloture which would have ended the opposition's filibuster and forced a vote on the legislation. Senate Vote Kills Bill, supranote 4, at A-9.
6. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
7. 304 U.S. at 345-46. This employer prerogative to permanently replace workers
striking for economic reasons is referred to as the Mackay doctrine prerogative.
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While legal scholars have long debated the merits of the
Mackay doctrine,' organized labor and management have only
recently begun to express vehement and contrasting views on this
issue.' Part IA of this article will review the Mackay doctrine and
the historical context from which it emerged. Part I.B summarizes
existing arguments advocating passage of the Workplace Fairness
'Act.
Part H examines an issue that is crucial to the debate: whether
management's use and threatened use of permanent replacements
has significantly increased in the past decade. Evidence will be set
forth demonstrating that management has increasingly used,
threatened to use, and had the propensity to use permanent
replacements. This evidence receives separate attention since it is
an intensely disputed point, 0 and its full development is necessary
to the argument which will be presented in Part III.
Part I presents an argument justifying passage of the
Workplace Fairness Act not fully developed by proponents of the bill:
management's increasing hostility towards the very existence of
unions and the process of collective bargaining has detracted from
the goals of the NLRA. Further, while passage of the Workplace
Fairness Act cannot change management's attitudes, it may help to
attenuate the effect of those attitudes by limiting the legitimate
scope of their expression, thereby furthering the goals of the
NLRA. 11
8. E.g., Leonard B. Boudin, The Rights of Strikers, 35 ILL. L. REV. 817, 830-32 (1941)
(arguing that an employer cannot retain replacement workers when strikers request
reinstatement); Note, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630 (1966)
(arguing that the Mackay doctrine violates the intent of the NLRA). But see David
Westfall, Striker Replacements and Employee Freedom of Choice, 7 LAB. L.J. 137, 146
(Winter 1991) (arguing that Mackay provides an essential system of checks and balances
in collective bargaining).
9. See William H. Miller, Labor and Management Forcesare Girdingfor a Brawl over
a ProposedBan on HiringPermanentStrikerReplacements, INDUSTRY WK., July 2, 1990,
at 56. Indeed, the bill is among the highest legislative priorities for both organized labor
and business. Id.
10. The proponents of the bill asserted that there has been a substantial increase in
the use of permanent replacements since the 1980s. S. REP. NO. 111, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 10-16 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 57, 102d Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 17-20 (1991).
However, its opponents argued that there had not been an increase or change in
management's use of permanent replacements in the 1980s. S. REP. NO. 111, supra, at
39-40; H.R. REP. No. 57, supra, at 46-47.
11. This argument parallels the logic supporting anti-discrimination legislation.
While such legislation cannot change race, age or sex biases, it can limit the effect of
these attitudes by limiting the legitimate scope of their expression. E.g., Civil Rights Act
of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) (prohibiting employers from discriminating
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin in employment decisions); Age
Discrimination Act of 1975 § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of age for federally funded programs).
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I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Mackay Doctrineand the NationalLabor RelationsAct

Any discussion of the Mackay doctrine must be prefaced by a
review of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 and the historical context from which it emerged.13 The NLRA grew out of a
period of wide spread poverty and labor turmoil. At the end of World
War I, "15 million American families were living in poverty and 86
percent of wage earners were receiving incomes below the level of
health and decency." 4 From 1933 to 1935 "uncontrolled, and economically crippling labor-management conflicts ... pervaded the
American economy." 5 In particular, there was a proliferation of
strikes. In. 1933 there were 812,137 workers involved in strikes; the
number rose to 1,277,344 the following year. 6 In addition to this
significant increase in strike activity, 7 striking workers were permanently replaced in sixty percent of such strikes.'8 Due in part to
this tremendous conflict, organized labor had been reduced to one
half the strength it had attained in the 1920s. 9
Prior to the enactment of the NLRA in 1935,20 the growth of
unionism was impeded by Supreme Court decisions. For example,
the Court used anti-trust laws, initially intended to regulate business at the turn of the century, to limit the ability of unions to en12. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
13. See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR

LAW 39-42 (1983) (reviewing some of the major themes espoused in 1935 justifying
passage of the bill).
14. A Bill to Promote Equality of BargainingPowerBetween Employers and Employees, to Diminish the Causes of Labor Disputes, to Create a National Labor Relations
Board, and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1935) [hereinafter NLRA Hearings No. 1] (statement of Sen.
Wagner), reprintedin LEGISLATWE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF
1935, at 1408 (1985) [hereinafter NLRA HISTORY].
15. ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, SEMINAR: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN A CHANGING
ECONOMY 6 (1991). See also Paul C. Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract
and the Prospectsfor Union Representation,98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 358 (1984) (noting that
the NLRA emerged in the context of"serious industrial unrest").
16. NLRA Hearings No.1, supra note 14, at 36. "Within a span of 24 months, over
32,000,000 man-days were lost because of labor controversies." Id.
17. See Weiler, supra note 15, at 369 n.59 ("e
ratio of time lost due to strikes
jumped fivefold, from an average of .05% of the time worked between 1929 and 1931 to
.25% between 1933 and 1935.").
18. ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 15, at 22 (citing WILLIAM SPRIGGS, THE
PERMANENT REPLACEMENT OF STRIKING WORKERS: MICRO-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM: BEFORE
THE WAGNER ACT (Economic Policy Institute Working Paper, 1990)).
19. ATLESON, supra note 13, at 35. Professor Atleson also notes that "[tihe New Deal
began at a time when less than 10 percent of the work force was organized." Id.
20. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1988)).
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gage in concerted activity.2 ' Even legislation specifically enacted as a
means of fostering unionism was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.' To the extent that the labor movement was able to
overcome these obstacles and mobilize workers, it was still hindered
by rulings sharply limiting its activities. In one case the Court held
that only one union worker at a time could picket a struck employer.'
In passing the NLRA, Congress intended to remedy serious
industrial unrest and promote industrial peace by enhancing the
legitimate function of unions in our society.' One element of the
legislative strategy was to prohibit discharge of or discrimination
against a union worker for engaging in statutorily protected union
activities such as the strike.' A Senate Committee Report assessing
the Workplace Fairness Act noted:
At the core of the Act is Congress' intent to promote collective bargaining
as the preferred method of resolving labor-management disputes and preserving economic stability in the private sector....
The NLRA promises workers that they shall have the right, without
fear of employer disciplne [sic] or discharge, to join unions, to bargain collectively, and-if no agreement can be reached-to 2participate in peaceful
concerted activity to further their bargaining goals. 6
21. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 275-76 (1908) (declaring that antitrust laws were
applicable to labor as well as capital); NLRA HearingsNo.1, supranote 14, at 34.
22. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 4 (1914) (Kansas law imposing penalties on employers who required as a condition of employment that employees not join labor unions
violated Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161, 180 (1907) (holding that Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit interstate railroads from discriminating against employees because of union
membership).
23. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 206
(1921). "We think that the strikers and their sympathizers engaged in the economic
struggle should be limited to one representative for each point of ingress and egress [to]
the plant." Id.
24. See S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 3. "The longer range expectation was that,
by thus endorsing the fundamental legitimacy of union representation, the law would lay
the foundation for constructive dialogue as the labor relations system evolved." Weiler,
supra note 15, at 369 n.60.
25. NLRA §§ 7, 8(a)(1)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1)(3) (1988).
26. S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 3; see also Weiler, supra note 15, at 365. In
1935 the House Committee on Labor commented:
[T]he [NLRA] seeks to redress an inequality of bargaining power by forbidding
employers to interfere with the development of employee organization, thereby
removing one of the issues most provocative of industrial strike and bringing
about a general acceptance of the orderly procedure of collective bargaining under circumstances in which the employer cannot [exploit] the economic weakness of his employees.
H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1935), reprinted in NLRA HISTORY, supra
note 14, at 2924.
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Congress was also aware that seventy-five percent of all work
stoppages were "due directly or indirectly to the failure of the employer to recognize the rights of the employee to organize."27 As a
means of eliminating the need for "recognition strikes," Congress
delegated to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) resolution
of the issue of a given union's status as a collective bargaining
agent. This separated the determination of a union's status from
the private actions of labor and management. The NLRA established
that the NLRB would determine a union's representational status
through NLRB-supervised certification elections. 9 Congress
believed that "the device of the election in a democratic society ha[d],
among other virtues, that of allaying strife, not provoking it." 0
These certification elections would be the sole means to determine
whether the union would be recognized as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees,3 ' and whether the employer would
therefore be obligated to bargain in good faith with the union over
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.2 However,
determination of the terms and conditions of the collective
bargaining agreement remained with labor and management
bargaining in the context of the marketplace, each with access33 to
such legitimized means of self-help as the strike and the lock out.
The seminal case of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph14 gave
27. To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S.2926 Before the Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934) [hereinafter NLRA Hearings No. 21
(testimony of Sen. Robert F. Wagner), reprintedin NLRA HISTORY, supra note 14, at 44.
28. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970). See also Weiler, supra note 15,
at 369 n.60, noting that "[olne tangible contribution of the Act was to substitute a formal
legal procedure for employee self-help in securing collective bargaining rights, thereby
removing the need for the 'recognition' strikes that racked industry in the 1930s."
29. NLRA § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §159 (c)(1) (1988).
30. H.R. REP. No. 969, supra note 26, at 20, reprintedin NLRA History, supra note
14, at 2930.
31. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §159(a) (1988).
32. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988). See generally JULIUS G. GETMAN &
BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE

123-37 (1988) (discussing the role of the law in insuring good faith bargaining).
33. See Weiler, supranote 15, at 385.
The tone of American labor law, especially as set by the Supreme Court, is unmistakable: once the NLRB has performed the task of protecting the right of
workers to organize, it is to stand above the fray and not concern itself with the
outcomes produced by the new collective regime. Outcomes are regarded as the
result of natural economic forces for which the law should not be held responsible ....
Id. It is also argued that the NLRA was intended to promote the employer's acceptance of
"national or pattern agreements, seniority, work rules, and expanding wages and
benefits." Roger Keeran & Gregory Tarpinian, Public Policy and the Recent Decline of
Strikes, 18 POVY STUD. J. 421, 463 (1989).
34. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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the Court one of its first opportunities to interpret the newly enacted
NLRA. The Court held that the NLRB was correct in ruling that
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.3" committed an unfair labor practice
when, at the conclusion of an "economic "31 strike it refused to reinstate five striking workers who had participated prominently in
union activities.
However, the critical significance of the decision is not its holding, but is instead its "classic obiter dictum,"38 commonly referred to
as the Mackay doctrine. Justice Roberts, in this well-known dictum,
commented that it was not an unfair labor practice when Mackay
Radio permanently displaced its striking employees:
Nor was it an unfair labor practice to replace the striking employees with
others in an effort to carry on the business. Although section 13... pro-

35. In particular, the practices of one branch of the Mackay Radio and Telegraph
Company located in San Francisco were at issue. Id. at 336.
36. "Economic" strike and "unfair labor practices" strike are terms of art in the field
of labor law.
Section 2(3) of the [NLRA] provides that strikers retain their employee
status while on strike. Whether they have an absolute right to reinstatement,
however, depends primarily upon whether the stoppage is determined to be an
unfair labor practice strike or an economic strike. An unfair labor practices
strike is strike activity initiated in whole or in part in response to unfair labor
practices committed by the employer. An economic strike, is one that is neither
caused nor prolonged by an unfair labor practice on the part of the employer ....
[A] strike which begins as an economic strike may be converted into an
unfair labor practice strike by acts of the employer, thereby changing the status
of the participants to unfair labor practice strikers....
WALTER E. OBERER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY 501 (3d ed. 1986) (citing CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1007-15 (1983)). See also Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 493

(1983) (explaining the difference between "economic" and "unfair labor practices" strikes),
37. 304 U.S. at 338-39. The union charged that the Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.
had
discharged and was refusing to employ five men who had not been reinstated to
their positions for the reason that they had joined and assisted the labor organization known as Local No. 3 and had engaged in concerted activities with other
employees of the respondent for the purpose of collective bargaining and other
mutual aid and protection; that by such discharge respondent had interfered
with, restrained, and coerced the employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act and so had been guilty
of an unfair labor practice within the meaning of section 8(1) of the act. The
complaint further alleged that the discharge of these men was a discrimination
in respect of their hire and tenure of employment and a discouragement of
membership in Local No. 3, and thus an unfair labor practice within the meaning of section 8(3) of the act.
Id. at 339 (footnotes omitted).
38. Samuel Estreicher, Strikers andReplacements, 38 LAB, L.J. 287, 289 (1987).
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vides, "Nothing in this Act... shall be construed so as to interfere with or
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike," it does not follow that
an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the right
to protect and continue his- business by supplying places left vacant by
strikers. And he is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of
strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their employment, in order to create places for them. The assuranceby respondentto those who accepted employment during the strike-that if they so desired their places
might be permanent was not an unfairlaborpractice, nor was it such to reinstate only so many of the strikers as there were vacant places to be

filled.39

Despite the fact that this language was mere dictum, it has endured
as controlling law to this very day and has been elevated to the
status of a doctrine, albeit a doctrine which legal scholars, and more
recently organized labor, have strongly criticized.40
B.

Summary of Existing Arguments Supporting Enactment of the
Workplace FairnessAct

1. The Mackay Doctrine is Inconsistent with the Intent of the
NLRA. The NLRA is Congress' primary effort to promote harmony
in labor-management relations. In creating the Mackay doctrine, the
Supreme Court has weakened congressional efforts in three respects. First, the Mackay doctrine is fallaciously predicated on the
notion that there is a distinction between permanently replacing
and firing a union worker for engaging in strike activity.4 ' Opponents of the Workplace Fairness Act (i.e., management) argue that
there are significant practical differences because entitlements and
benefits are either guaranteed or withheld depending on whether
the worker was "fired" or "replaced. 42 If a worker is fired, he is no
39. 304 U.S. at 345-46 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
40. "Few rules of American labor law have been as heavily criticized as the legality
of hiring permanent strike replacements." Weiler, supra note 15, at 393. Professor Atleson argues that the Mackay doctrine "assumes a set of rights that allows an employer 'to
protect and continue his business,'" and that it deviates from the intent of the NLRA.
ATLESON, supra note 13, at 18-34. See supra part I.B for an elaboration of the arguments
against the Mackay doctrine.
41. The NLRA prohibits discharge of any union worker for engaging in such concerted activities as striking. NLRA § 8(a)(1), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1988). Under
the Mackay doctrine, an employer's permanent replacement of striking workers is not an
unfair labor practice because the doctrine distinguishes between permanently replacinga
worker and permanently firing a worker. Mackay, 304 U.S. at 345-46. See infra notes 4952 and accompanying text (arguing that the distinction between permanent replacement
and firing is not material under the principles of the NLRA).
42. See Thompson, Mann & Hutson, Fired vs. Replaced: A World of Difference (Issue
Paper) in ProhibitingPermanentReplacement of Striking Workers: Hearings on H.R. 5
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1991) [hereinafter Aviation Comm. Hearings]; Labor
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longer considered to be an employee of the company and has no
guarantee of reinstatement. But if the employer permanently replaces a striking worker, he or she must be reinstated as long as
there is a position available after the strike ends.43 Other benefits
which are guaranteed to permanent replacements but withheld from
fired workers include access to health care benefits, unemployment
insurance, accrual of seniority, and the right to vote on all decisions
affecting the bargaining unit for a full year after replacement."
Given the disparities in benefits available to replaced as opposed to
fired workers, opponents conclude that there is a "world of difference" between firing and replacing a worker permanently,4 5 and4 thus
the Mackay doctrine is consistent with the intent of the NLRA. 1
These arguments fail to recognize that there is no distinction
under the only relevant criteria, the terms of the NLRA. The NLRA
states that the employer's actions cannot be "construed so as to
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike."47
Under this test, there is no practical difference in effect between
firing and permanently replacing workers. "[In both instances the
employee suffers loss of his job because he dared to exercise his
statutory right to strike."48 Professor Weiler has noted that
Comm. Hearings,supra note 3, at 169 (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at 135 (statement of
Peter G. Nash); S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 36; Westfall, supra note 8,at 143.
43. Mackay, 304 U.S. at 345-46; NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer, 389 U.S. 375, 378-81
(1967); Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99, 105 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
920 (1970); see also Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 493 (1983) (outlining the
difference between economic and unfair labor practices strikes); OBERER ET AL., supra
note 36, at 501.
The reinstatement rights of permanently replaced strikers were recently diminished
in NLRB v. Delta-Macon Brick and Tile Co., 943 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1991). Delta-Macon
involved a lay-off of permanent replacements after a down-turn in business. When
business improved, the company began reinstatement from the pool of laid-off permanent
replacements instead of the pool of replaced strikers. The court held that this preferential
treatment of laid-off permanent replacements was not an unfair labor practice. Id. at 576.
44. Aviation Comm. Hearings,supra note 42, at 54.
45.Id.
46. See S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 37-39 (minority views on S.55).
47. See NLRA § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988) (emphasis added).
48. Striker Replacement Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 5 Before the Subcomm. on
Transportationand HazardousMaterialsof the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1991) [hereinafter TransportationHearings] (testimony of
Lane Kirkland, President, A.F.L.-C.I.O.); see also S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 3-6;
H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 10, at 11-13; Rona L. Pietrzak, Some Reflections on
Mackay's Application to Legal Economic Strikes in the Public Sector: An Analysis of State
Collective BargainingStatutes, 68 OR. L. REV. 87, 93 (1989) (arguing that "Mackay inadequately considered the scope of employee protection under the NLRA); George Schatzki,
Some Observations and Suggestions Concerninga Misnomer---'Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEx. L. REV. 378, 382-89 (1969); Weiler, supranote 15, at 389-90.
Furthermore, permanent replacement of striking workers not only "entails a risk of
derogation from the right to strike, [but also] may affect the free exercise of trade union
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[a]lthough the law distinguishes the two actions based on the subjective
intent of the employer, the employee may be excused for not perceiving a
practical difference as far as his rights under section 7 are concerned. The
bleak prospect of permanently losing his job is obviously likely to chill an
employee's willingness to exercise his statutory right to engage in
'concerted activities.' 9

Any disparity between the rights of permanently replaced and
fired workers to reinstatement and access to government benefits is
immaterial and irrelevant to an analysis guided by the principles of
the NLRA. Since management's use of permanent replacements
does impede and diminish the statutory right to strike, the argument that the Mackay doctrine undermines the intent of the NLRA
is justifiable. 0
The second way in which the MacKay doctrine undermines the
intent of the NLRA is by circumventing the requirement of NLRB
determination as to the representational status of a union." Lane
Kirkland, President of the A.F.L.-C.I.O, argued in support of the
Workplace Fairness Act, stating that use of permanent replacements "allows an employer to convert a dispute over what the terms
of a particular collective bargaining agreement will be into a dispute
over the future status of the union and over the collective bargaining
relationship itself.""
Mr. Kirkland's conclusion that an employer's use of permanent
replacements converts a labor dispute into a struggle over the union's continued survival is supported by a number of studies. An
Economic Policy Institute study found that "unions are anywhere
from two and one-half to almost eleven times more likely to be decertified in strikes where permanent replacements are used." 3 In
other words, in instances where permanent replacements are emrights.'" ILO Body Questions U.S. Policy Regarding PermanentReplacement of Striking
Workers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 147, at A-6 (July 31, 1991), available in LEXIS, BNA

Library, DLABRT File (quoting a report prepared by the ILO Governing Body's Comm. on
Freedom of Association).
49. Weiler, supranote 15, at 390 (citing NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988)).
50. See infra part III.A for a discussion of the multitude of negative effects that the
use of permanent replacements has on a union worker's ability to exercise the right to
strike. See also infra note 174 (discussing the Caterpillar strike).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
52. TransportationHearings, supra note 48, at 37 (emphasis added); see also Note,
supra note 8, at 634.
It has also been argued that employer use of permanent replacements may be part of
an overall strategy to break the union or otherwise create a union-free environment. S.
REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 20-21; see also Labor Comm. Hearings,supra note 3, at 31
(discussing the increasing use of anti-union consulting firms). See infra notes 170-206 and
accompanying text for a discussion on how increased use of permanent replacements and
other unfair labor practices indicates an overall anti-union strategy.
53. See ECONOIvC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 15, at 20.
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ployed, the union's chances of survival are only 40 percent, whereas
when either temporary or no replacements are used, the union survival rate is between 98 to 100 percent.' A United Auto Workers
survey examined 42 strikes in which employers used permanent
replacements. The two most common resolutions were "union decertified," occurring in thirteen instances or 31 percent of the strikes,
and "union accepted employer terms or significant concession," occurring in twelve instances or 29 percent of the strikes.55
Given these results when an employer resorts to permanent
replacement of striking workers, the Mackay doctrine "is an invitation to the employer.., to rid himself of union adherents and the
union."55 As a result, the Mackay doctrine deviates from the policy
intent of the NLRA: management's use of permanent replacements
shifts the determination of a given union's representational status
away from NLRB to the private determination of employers.
Finally, employer use of permanent replacements frustrates the
expeditious settlement of labor disputes by encouraging conflict.
Bernard DeLury, Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (FMCS)67 commented that use of permanent replacements
54. Id. at 35. This data caused Professor Cynthia Gramm, the author of the study, to
conclude that "the use of permanent replacements hinders the survival of the bargaining
relationship." Id.
55. Labor Comm. Hearings,supra note 3, at 218-21.
56. Schatzki, supra note 48, at 383; see also ATLESON, supra note 13, at 27; Weiler,
supra note 15, at 390. "Thus, if an employer succeeds in mitigating the strike's economic
impact by hiring a sizable cadre of permanent replacements, it can look forward to a possible end of the dispute through an NLRB-sponsored vote eliminating the union
altogether." Id. (citing NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1982)).
57. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) is an independent
agency which was created in 1947 as successor to the United States Conciliation Service.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 172 (1988); see also
WILLIAi E. SIMKIN & NICHOLAS A. FIDANDIs, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAiiCS OF CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING 37-38 (1986). Congress directs that:

The [Federal Mediation and Conciliation] Service may proffer its services in any
labor dispute in any industry affecting commerce, either upon its own motion or
upon the request of one or more of the parties to the dispute, whenever in its
judgment such dispute threatens to cause a substantial interruption of commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 173(b). Congressional policy favors FMCS participation in collective
bargaining when such participation is necessary to facilitate voluntary agreements
between labor and management: "ITihe settlement of issues between employers and employees through collective bargaining may be advanced by making available full and adequate governmental facilities for conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration to aid
and encourage employers and the representatives of their employees to reach and
maintain agreements...." 29 U.S.C.S. § 171(b). However, under the rules of the FMCS,
"[i]ntercession by a mediator on his own motion should be limited to exceptional cases."
29 C.F.R. app. § 1400 (1991). Between 1961 and 1981, the FMCS employed between 214
and 350 full-time labor mediators. SIAiKIN & FIDANDIS, supra, at 38. For a general
discussion of the role of mediation in the context of collective bargaining disputes, see
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"exacerbates" 8 the settlement process:
There are times when we will help the parties get through the wages and
the conditions and the benefits... only to still have the issue of what to
do about permanent replacement workers still on the table.... [It is difficult to get rank-and-fie members to ratify that agreement if they don't
back to work. That's what I mean about
have any assurances of coming
59
exacerbating the process.
In addition to making settlement more difficult, use of permanent replacements entrenches conflict by protracting strikes." An
Economic Policy Institute study revealed:
[Sitrikes last substantially longer when permanent replacements are
hired than when temporary replacements are hired. Strikes also last
longer when temporary replacements are hired than when no replacements are hired. The differences are fairly substantial. For example, in
the U.S. sample, the mean duration of strikes in which permanent replacements were hired is 363 days. The mean duration when temporary
hired was 72 days. When no replacements were hired,
replacements were
6
it was 64 days. '
This empirical evidence strongly indicates that employer use of
permanent replacements adversely affects the continued survival of
the union and the collective bargaining process itself by entrenching
conflict. 62 Since one of the principal goals of the NLRA is to minimize
industrial strife by promoting healthy labor relations, 63 enactment of
the Workplace Fairness Act would further the policy objectives of
the NLRA by overturning the Mackay doctrine.
Opponents of the Workplace Fairness Act argue that the legislation would not promote healthy labor relations for several reasons.
Senator Orrin Hatch - one of the most vigorous opponents of the
generally SIMIKIN & FIDANDIS, supra. See also infra note 174 for a discussion of the role of
the FMCS in a recent labor dispute between the United Auto Workers and Caterpillar,
Inc.
58. Chief U.S. Mediator Says Use of PermanentStrike Replacements Makes Bargaining 'Difficult,' Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 203, at A-5 (Oct. 21, 1991), available in LEXIS,
BNA Library, DLABRT File. As head of the federal agency whose mission it is to mediate
the most entrenched labor-management disputes, Mr. DeLury is uniquely qualified to assess how the use or threatened use of permanent replacements effects contract
negotiations or settlement once a strike commences.
59. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 20-22; ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 15, at 53 (explaining how the permanent replacement of striking
workers at the Androscoggin Mill in Jay hindered settlement); DEREK C. BoK & JOHN T.
DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 229 (1970); Weiler, supra note 15, at 380.
60. ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 15, at 36-37.
61. Id. at 36; see also S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 20-22.
62. While the use of permanent replacements usually protracts the length of a strike,
it may also serve to shorten it, as in the case of the Caterpillar strike. See infra note 174.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33.
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Workplace Fairness Act - argued that passage of the bill "would
likely mean an increased number of strikes, an increased risk of
anti-competitive collective bargaining agreements, or both." 4 He
asserted that healthy well-balanced labor relations would be ultimately enhanced by the defeat of the bill.
This argument is premised on at least two fallacious assumptions. Senator Hatch assumes that a decrease in the number of
strikes necessarily should be interpreted as an indication of healthy
well-balanced labor relations.' However, the following observations
of two labor economists, regarding the decline of strikes in the
1980s, discredit this view:
[O]ccurring in d context of soaring profits and executive salaries and widening disparities of wealth, the decline in strikes neither signals growing
social wellbeing nor foreshadows social peace. Indeed, the period of the
1920s and the early 1930s was also one of... declining strikes, and growing social disparities, and the period following it contained the greatest
66
number of strikes ....
In short, a decline in strikes may be symptomatic of healthy labor
relations, but it may also characterize an imbalance in bargaining
power: unions may be reluctant to strike because a strike, followed
by an employer's resort to permanent replacements, may be suicide
for the union.
Another assumption in Senator Hatch's argument is that
elimination of the employer prerogative of permanent replacement
would make collective bargaining agreements "anti-competitive.""
While any attempt to evaluate the merits of Senator Hatch's bald
assertion would require a detailed discussion beyond the scope of
this article, 69 a preliminary assessment of the evidence suggests that
his assertion is wrong. "All measures of profitability show that comparable U.S. firms operating in Canada without the Mackay rule are
as profitable as American firms operating under Mackay in the
United States." 70 Furthermore, several of our international competi64. S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 35.
65. For a similar argument, see Orley Ashenfelter & George E. Johnson, Bargaining
Theory, Trade Unions,and IndustrialStrike Activity, 58 AI.ECON. REV.35, 35-41 (1969).
66. Keeran & Tarpinian, supra note 33, at 468; see also infra notes 151-56 and
accompanying text (statistics indicating a dramatic drop in strikes in the 1980s).
67. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text, discussing evidence that an employer's use of permanent replacements often results in the destruction of the union.
68. S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 35.
69. For example, the discussion would have to compare the effects of permanent
replacement laws in other countries and take into account such factors as the macro-legal
structures (especially labor law), and the traditions and ethos of labor-management relations in those countries.
70. ECONOMIC POLICY INsTrruTE, supra note 15, at 26-27 (citation omitted). This
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tors, many of whom currently have the competitive advantage in
their trade balance with the United States, have laws which limit
or
71
eliminate the use of permanent replacements in their country.
Other evidence diminishing Senator Hatch's argument was set
forth by labor economist William E. Spriggs.72 Spriggs asserts that
the Workplace Fairness Act would actually benefit the United States
competitively by fostering unionism, and he predicates his position
on three findings:
1. Unions lower employee quit rates, achieving the work force stability
that many regard as a key feature of Japanese economic success;
2. Workplace innovations such as quality circles are more likely to occur in
union settings than nonunion settings; and,
3. Unions shift the composition of compensation packages toward fringe
benefits, fostering an increase in pension funds and health care for those
on pensions.73
Spriggs concluded that "[als long as managers base their competitive
strategies on low wages in -an environment that makes breaking
unions easy, they will avoid the more positive and productive path.
Competition based on lowering wages and benefits is not a step forward into the new economic order, but -a step backward." 74 Contrary
to Senator Hatch's claims, the Workplace Fairness Act would be a
positive force promoting peaceful and healthy labor-management
relations.
2. Restoring JudicialLimitation of the Mackay Doctrine. Recent
Supreme Court decisions have effectively expanded the Mackay
section of the study included the following statistics: "U.S. Non-Financial Firms' Sales in
Canada as Percent of All Canadian Sales, 1966 to 1987," id. at 25; "Profit Margin of U.S.
Firms in Canada Relative to U.S. Industry Norms by Selected Industries, 1987," id. at 26;
"Return on Assets of U.S. Firms in Canada Relative to U.S. Industry Norms by Selected
Industries, 1987," id. at 27; "Return on Net Worth of U.S. Firms in Canada Relative to
U.S. Industry Norms by Selected Industries, 1987," id. at 28.
71. S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 29 (Germany, Japan, Canada, and France);
Matthew W. Finkin, LaborPolicy and the Enervationof the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL.
L. REV. 547, 569-70 (1990) (Germany, Italy, France, and Canada). For examples of
Canadian provincial laws prohibiting employer use of permanent replacements, see
R.S.O., ch. 228, § 73 (1980); R.S.P.E.I., ch. L-1 (1974), amended by ch.39, 1987 P.E.I. Acts
1665; R.S.Q., ch. 41, § 98a (1977). See also PAUL C. WEiLER, GOVERNING THE WORKPiAcE
268 (1990) (observing that Ontario permits strikers to reclaim their jobs for up to six
months after the beginning of the strike, even if replacements hired in the interim must
be let go).
72. Statements on Striker Replacement Legislation (H.R. 5) Delivered March 13
before the House Education & Labor Sub-Committee on Labor-ManagementRelations,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at D-1 (Mar. 14, 1991), available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
DLABRT File.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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doctrine by negating or undermining historic judicial limitations on
its use.75 A case in point is the 1983 decision in Belknap, Inc. v.
Hale,76 which created an economic incentive for employers to refuse
reinstatement of permanently replaced strikers following the cessation of strike activity. The employer in Belknap breached its promise to
permanent replacements when it reinstated striking workers at the end
of the economic strike.77 The Supreme Court held that a state suit
commenced by permanent replacements against the employer for
breach of contract was not preempted by federal labor law. 7
The rule in Belknap has been criticized on at least two grounds.
First, it gives greater meaning to the promise of permanency than
actually exists. "In general, the employer cannot guarantee permanent status to the replacements it hires, for there is nothing permanent in such indefinite, nonunion 'employment at will,' subject as it
is not only to layoffs for business reasons, but also to dismissal at
the employer's discretion."79 Similarly, Judge Learned Hand observed that "it is probably true today that most men taking jobs so
made vacant, realize from the outset how tenuous is their hold." 80
Belknap is also criticized for making settlement of strikes more
difficult. In particular,
[i]f the union "wins" the strike, an employer may nevertheless be reluctant
to reinstate strikers lest it become liable to the replacements. As the
strike drags on an employer may prefer offering reinstatement condi-

tioned upon concessionary contract terms but hesitate for fear of inciting a
suit by the replacements.... Under any scenario if the reinstatement of
strikers becomes the union's bottom line in resolving a strike, Belknap
81
provides a rationale or crutch for resisting, thereby prolonging a strike.

75. See H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 10, at 14, 16-17 (pt.3); S. REP. NO. 111, supra
note 10, at 7, 9-10; Finkin, supra note 71, at 549-66 (arguing that both recent Supreme
Court and NLRB decisions have expanded the employer's Mackay doctrine prerogative);
see also James B. Atleson, The Prospects for Labor Law Reform, 18 POLY STUD. J. 364,
368-71 (1989) (arguing that the Supreme Court's perception that unions are weakened
has increasingly encouraged the Court to construe the NLRA against the interests of labor).
76.463 U.S. 491 (1983).
77. Id. at 500.
78. Id. "[When an employer attempts to exercise... [its] privilege by promising the
replacements that they will not be discharged to make room for returning strikers, it
surely does not follow that the employer's otherwise valid promises of permanent
employment are nullified by federal law and its otherwise actionable misrepresentations
may not be pursued." Id.
79. Weiler, supranote 15, at 391-92.
80. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 871 (2nd Cir. 1938); see also Estreicher, supra note 38, at 294.
81. Speech Delivered by Union Attorney Jonathan Axelrod at American Bar
Association's Mid-Winter Meeting in Phoenix, Ariz., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at F-i
(Mar. 6, 1991), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, DLABRT File [hereinafter Axelrod
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The Mackay doctrine was further reinforced by the 1989 decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight
Attendants, 2 which weakened the precedent set in NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp.3 In Erie Resistor, the employer offered twenty years
of super-seniority to "crossovers"8' and replacements as a "credit
against future layoffs" and as a means of attracting them to work
during the union's economic strike.5 The Court ruled that the NLRB
was entitled to find that this super-seniority scheme constituted
"conduct which carried its own: indicia of intent and which is barred
by the [NLRA] ... ." The Court reasoned that the super-seniority
scheme would create long-lasting animosity between returning
strikers and replacements and that the scheme "by its very terms
operat[ed] to discriminate between strikers and nonstrikers, both
during and after a strike.""7 The Court also explicitly noted that it
was "not prepared to extend" the Mackay doctrine to allow the
employer's tactics in that case. 8
Speech]; see also S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 9-10; Belknap, 463 U.S. at 531-532

(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority rule in Belknap will discourage
settlement of labor disputes); H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 10, at 17; Finkin, supra note
71, at 550-556 ("[Bly giving an assurance of permanence, the employer will have
significantly obstructed if not totally frustrated any bargaining for the reinstatement of
strikers."); Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off, Tune It Out, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 295,
302 (1991); Kevin J. Fay, Comment, Strikebreakers, The Supreme Court, and Belknap,
Inc. v. Hale: The ContinuingErosionof FederalLabor Preemption, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 839,
866-67 (1985); supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text (discussing that an employer's
resort to permanent replacements adversely affects the prospects of settling a labor-management dispute).
82. 489 U.S. 426 (1989).
83. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
84. A "crossover" is a striking worker who defects from the strike activity and returns to work. Trans World Airlines, 489 U.S. at 430.
85. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 223.
86. Id at 231. Normally, a finding of intent is required because the NLRA prohibits
an employer from intentionally discriminating against workers who engage in protected
concerted activity such as a strike. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). However,
under certain circumstances, such as those in Erie Resistor, proof of employer intent (or
animus) is not required because the practices at issue are deemed to be so destructive of
an employee's rights, guaranteed under the section 7 of the NLRA, that they "carry their
own indicia of intent." 373 U.S. at 231. The Erie Resistor Court noted that certain unfair
labor practices may be saved from illegality by an "overriding business purpose justifying
the invasion of union rights," id., but neither the Court nor the NLRB found any such
overriding business purpose in that case. For a complete discussion of the intent
requirement for unfair labor practices determinations, see infra notes 181-202 and accompanying text.
87. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 231.
88. Id. at 232. The Court in Erie Resistor was willing to assume that the employer in
that case acted in good faith and for the same reasons that the employer in Mackay did.
Id. at 236-37. Ironically, however, despite its finding of similar motive and intent, the
Court found that the conduct of the Erie Resistor Co. (offering striker replacements su-
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Notwithstanding its prior holding in Erie Resistor, the Supreme
Court held in Trans World Airlines that junior strikers could in
effect be enticed to crossover with the knowledge that the employer
would not displace them when full-term senior strikers returned,
even though the junior workers had lower seniority.8 9 The union
argued that Erie Resistor was controlling since it prohibited em"ployer incentive schemes which were predicated upon offering super-seniority. ° The Court rejected this argument on the grounds
that the facts of Trans World Airlines were distinguishable: "once reinstated, the seniority of full-term strikers is in no way affected by
their decision to strike," whereas, in Erie Resistor, the super-seniority scheme continued even after all the workers returned 1
The distinction drawn by the majority in Trans World Airlines,
that the super-seniority scheme used by Trans World Airlines did
not have lingering effects once full-term senior strikers were reinstated, belied the facts of that case. As the union in Trans World
Airlines argued in its brief,
desirable job assignments and domiciles that would have been occupied by
the most senior flight attendants had there been no strike will continue to
be held by those who did not see the strike through to its conclusion. For

example, the senior full-term striker who worked in the Los Angeles domicile before the strike may have been replaced by a junior crossover. As
poststrike vacancies develop in TWA's work force, permitting reinstatement of full-term strikers, they are not likely to occur in the most desirable domiciles. Thus, it is unlikely that the . senior
full-term striker would
2

be reinstated back to her preferred domicile

9

Given the lingering effects the super-seniority scheme would have
on choice of job assignments and domicile, proponents of the Workplace Fairness Act reject the distinction drawn by the Supreme
Court in Trans World Airlines. They argue instead that the reasoning and result are anomalous and weaken the historic judicial limitations of the Mackay doctrine represented by Erie Resistor.9
per-seniority) was an unfair labor practice, id. at 231, even though the Court had found
the employer practices in Mackay (using permanent replacements) to be acceptable,
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938). This distinction,
whereby the employer is allowed to permanently replace workers, but is not allowed to
use less severe measures prompted two scholars to note: "It is as though the law permits
killing but not wounding." GEimAN &POGREBIN, supra note 32, at 141.
89. Trans World Airlines, 489 U.S. at 438.
90. Id. at 436.
91. Id. at 435. The Court also explicitly noted that, even though it was applying the
Railway Labor Act, its determination would have been the same under the NLRA. Id. at
439-42.
92. Id. at 436.
93. See TransportationHearings, supra note 48, at 43 (testimony of Lane Kirkland);
S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 10; H. REP. NO. 57, supra note 10, at 16-17; Finkin, su-
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3. Rectifying the Imbalance in Available Economic Weapons.'
Trans World Airlines and Belknap erode the historic judicial limitations of the Mackay doctrine and reinforce the viability of an employer's use of permanent replacementsf5 The effects of these decisions are made even more potent by the imbalance
in economic
96
weapons available to management and labor:
Since Mackay Radio was decided, unions have lost the right to engage in
most forms of peaceful secondary activity and they have lost the right to
obtain commitments of strike solidarity. These developments have substantially enhanced management's power to use permanent replacements
with far greater effectiveness. During the same period, employers also

were given new weapons, including
the right to lock out the union offen9
sively even prior to impasse.

7

Professor Weiler argues that "the most crucial legal imbalance in
collective bargaining law [is that] the employer is permitted to continue operating during a strike by hiring permanent replacements,
whereas the union is barred from asking other unionized workers to
stop helping their employers carry on business as usual with the
struck employer."9 8
pra note 71, at 557.
94. The term "weapon" refers to any activity, counter-measure, or strategy (e.g.
strike, lock-out, boycott, etc.), used by management or labor to inflict some measure of
economic harm on the other party as a means to gain a more powerful negotiating
position for the purposes of collective bargaining. For example, in Trans World Airlines,
489 U.S. at 438, Justice O'Connor described the employer actions at issue in that case as
"fairly within the arsenal of economic weapons available to employers during a period of
self-help." See also S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 28 (referring to the employer's use
of an offensive lockout as a "weapon"); CHARLES R. PERRY ET AL., OPERATING DURING
STRIKES: COMPANY EXPERIENCE, NLRB POLICIES, AND GOVERNIENTAL REGULATIONS 12324 (The Wharton Sch. Labor Relations & Pub. Policy Series No. 23, 1982) (terming use of
permanent replacements "a weapon").
95. See supra text accompanying notes 75-93.
96. Professor Weiler points out that "Itihe real flaw in the law of collective bargaining lies not in its hands-off posture toward the substantive content of the agreement, but
in the way it defines and limits the weapons available to both sides in pressing their bargaining goals. The balance is skewed." Weiler, supranote 15, at 405.
97. S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 28; see also NLRA § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(4)(B) (1988); Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 115-16 (1985); H.R.
REP. No. 57, supranote 10, at 32.
98. Weiler, supra note 15, at 387. See generally GEITAN & POGREBIN, supra note 32,
at 245-55 (outlining the difference between permissible primary boycotting and prohibited
secondary boycotting).
The reduction in the union's bargaining strength due to the imbalance in available
economic weapons becomes even more exacerbated in contexts where striking workers
are already disadvantaged in the labor market. Weiler, supra note 15, at 387, 394;
Schatzki, supra note 48, at 384. Professor Schatzki observed:
The real effect of the doctrine is to give greater strength to those employers
who least need it, and to permit those employers to rid themselves of union em-
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The enervation of the union's power due to the imbalance in
available weapons is made vorse by limitations placed on a union's
ability to enforce internal solidarity.99 For example, in Pattern
0 the Supreme Court determined that a
Makers' League v. NLRB,0'
union may not use disciplinary sanctions to deter a union member
from defecting from a strike.' This ruling enhanced the effectiveness of the employer's arsenal to resist a strike while the union was
stripped of an important means of enforcing solidarity and strengthployees and the union. For example, it is unlikely that an employer of unskilled
labor could not find temporary replacements for striking employees in a community with a large unemployed population.
Id. Use of permanent replacements also reduces the chances that a newly organized bargaining unit will win a first contract. Weiler, supra note 15, at 390.
99. The union's power is also diminished by increased deregulation of the right of
non-employee union organizers to solicit unorganized workforces. A case on point is the
Supreme Court decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S.Ct. 841 (1992), which involved
non-employee union organizers who had attempted to solicit employees of Lechmere, Inc.
Lechmere was a store located in a plaza in a large metropolitan community, and the union attempted to place handbills on the windshields of employee automobiles parked in
the plaza parking lot owned by Lechmere. Id. Lechmere's management stepped the union
from soliciting on its parking lot, and the union filed an unfair labor practice complaint
with the NLRB. Id. Both the ALJ and the Board found that the employer committed an
unfair labor practice when it refused to allow the union access to the employees'
automobiles, and the First Circuit affirmed. Id.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,reversed the First Circuit, and denied enforcement of the NLRB order. Id. at 850. Central to the Court's analysis was a distinction
drawn between the rights of employee and non-employee union organizers. Id. at 845.
While employee union organizers were subject to greater protection, the rights of nonemployee organizers were more circumscribed. Id. at 848-49. Non-employee organizers
could trespass on the employer's property only in situations where access to employees
was otherwise all but impossible. Id. at 849-50. In his first significant majority opinion as
a Supreme Court Justice, Clarence Thomas held that "[slo long as non-employee union
organizers have reasonable access to employees outside an employer's property, the
requisite accommodation has taken place." Id. at 848. Thus, if the employees were
lumbeijacks living in a logging community, the Court was willing to allow trespass by
non-employee union organizers since there was no other reasonable means of access. Id.
at 849 (citing NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948)).
However, Justice Thomas held that the union did have "reasonable access" in the
Lechmere case because union organizers could hold up placards advising employees of the
benefits of union membership from a grassy section of public land located between
Lechmere's parking lot and the public highway. Id. at 849-50.
For more information on the Lechmere case and how it represents a judicial
deregulation of federal collective bargaining rights, see generally Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, The Legacy of IndustrialPluralism:The Tension Between Individual Employment
Rights and the New Deal Collective BargainingSystem, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 585
(1992).
100. 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
101. PatternMakers' League, 473 U.S. at 115-16; see also NLRB v. Textile Workers
Union, Local 1929, 409 U.S. 213 (1972) (holding that unions may not enforce rules or
agreements on bargaining unit solidarity against those who resign during strike in order
to cross picket lines).
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ening the strike. One author has commented that these developments signal "the Court's willingness to weigh the union's need to
maintain solidarity during a strike less heavily in a balance with
competing policies."0 2 Similarly, the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources noted that
each of these changes has enhanced the ability of an employer to use the
Mackay Radio doctrine, and has redounded to the disadvantage of
unions.... [T]he laws gradual sapping of union strength has made the
use of permanent replacements a far more attractive option for employers
to pursue today than it has been in years past. 103

The imbalance in available economic weapons and the limitations on a union's ability to enforce internal solidarity have been
effectuated, in part through the use of dual strands of reasoning.
When evaluating the legitimacy of union and management conduct,
courts will use one strand of reasoning to deem the union conduct
illegal and another to find management conduct acceptable. 1' 4 Professor Weiler commented on the Court's failure to apply parity of
reasoning:
Suppose it is agreed that the law should leave the employer free to replace
striking employees, to try and operate the business during a strike if it
can. Understandably the trade union will assert that the law must take
the same laissez-faire
attitude toward its own efforts to frustrate that
0 5
employer endeavor'

One case exemplifying the dualistic reasoning of the courts is
NLRB v. Teamsters Local 449 (Buffalo Linen),0 6 in which the
Supreme Court was quick to point out that an employee has a right
to defect from a strike and crossover as part of the statutory right to
"refrain from any or all of such activities."0 7 However, the Court
loses sight of this right when its application would detract from the
employer's effective use of a lockout: "Individual locked out employees have no comparable right to refrain from union activities. Employees are locked out of work and locked into the union's bargaining position regardless of whether they support or oppose it!" 10 8 In
102. Finkin, supra note 71, at 556. The competing policies referred to by Professor
Finkin are "individual liberty vis-a-vis the collectivity." Id.
103. S. REP. No. 111, supranote 10, at 15.
104. Axelrod Speech, supranote 81.
105. PAUL WEILER, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: NEW DIRECTIONs IN CANADIAN
LABOUR LAW 78(1980).
106. 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
107. Id. at 96. Accord Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 96 (1985)
(unions may not discipline an employee for refraining from the union's strike activity or
becoming a crossover).
108. Axelrod Speech, supra note 81. Axelrod notes that this rule compels hidividual
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short, the Court emphasizes the collective quality of the union
workforce to the benefit of the employer in the case of the employer
lockout, but emphasizes the individual quality of the union workforce (i.e., the individual right not to participate in union activities)
to the detriment of the union in the case of a strike.
Another case in which the Supreme Court used dual strands of
'reasoning is Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of
Flight Attendants.0 9 Justice O'Connor, in language equating the
statutory right to strike with a "gamble,""0 explained why the Court
would not allow full-term senior strikers to displace those junior
workers who returned to work before the strike ended (crossovers):
We see no reason why those employees who chose not to gamble on the
success of the strike should suffer the consequences when the gamble
proves unsuccessful. Requiring junior crossovers, who cannot themselves
displace the newly hired permanent replacements, and "who rank lowest
in seniority," to be displaced by more senior full-term strikers is precisely
to visit the consequences of the lost gamble on those who refused to take
the risk."'
However, nowhere in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion is it indicated that if a strike was successful" 2 it would be proper to withhold
the benefits of the successful "gamble" (higher wages and greater
benefits) from those workers who chose not to take the gamble and
go onstrike.
In sum, the Court in Trans World Airlines equated the strike to
a gamble when a risk-benefit analysis would benefit the employer.
This was the case when the Court determined that junior crossovers
should not lose their position when full-term senior strikers returned.13 But when equating a strike to a gamble would flesh out a
risk-benefit analysis so as to strengthen the perceived efficacy of
employees to "rely upon collective action and inherently destroys the vestige of individual
rights." Id. See generally James B. Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44
MD.L. REV. 841, 856-67 (1985) (exploring how economic "power imbalances also affect the
ability of labor and employees to communicate and express views" under the First
Amendment).

109. 489 U.S. 426 (1989).
110. Id. at 438-39. Professor Weiler commented:
[Tihere is an interesting comment by Justice O'Connor in... TWA, where she
refers to going on strike as a gamble; that employees bet their jobs when they go
on strike, and if they lose, don't come to the labor board, don't come to the judiciary asking for help. Now, that is a very strange, peculiar notion of a right, that
it is simply a gamble.
Labor Comm. Hearings,supra note 3, at 84.
111. 489 U.S. at 438 (citation omitted).
112. "Successful" meaning that the union won wage increases and benefits which the
employer had refused to grant prior to the strike.
113. 489 U.S. at 438.
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union activity, then the gambling frame of reference was abandoned:
the Court never hints that it would consider withholding wage increases to individuals who did not participate in strikes."4
The imbalance in available economic weapons, coinciding with
increasing limitations on a union's ability to enforce internal solidarity, further supports the argument for passage of the Workplace
Fairness Act. As the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources noted, "unions now have far fewer rights to counteract effectively an employer's use of permanent replacements."" 5 Eliminating
an employer's prerogative to permanently replace striking workers
may remedy the imbalance by equalizing the arsenal of available
economic weapons. "In short, passage of [the Workplace Fairness
Act] will help to restore, -not6 upset, the desired 'delicate balance' in
relative bargaining power.""
4. The Mackay Doctrine is Predicated on Invalid Assumptions.
Finally, the Mackay doctrine should be overturned because it is
predicated on invalid assumptions. First, the Mackay doctrine assumes that the employer has an inalienable right to operate and
hire replacements during a strike. Various scholars have argued
that such an assumption emanates from unsupported a priori notions concerning management prerogatives."17 Professor Atleson has
concluded that "[tihe long tenure of Mackay, the impossibility of
rationalizing the holding, and the hopelessness with which labor law
scholars view the opportunity for revision, suggest the doctrine is
based on8 some deep-seated notion of employer prerogatives and
rights.""
114. The Court's failure to apply parity of reasoning is highlighted to demonstrate

that the Workplace Fairness Act is a necessary first step in rectifying an imbalance in
economic weapons effectuated in part through the use of dualistic reasoning. The

dualistic reasoning of the Court is not fleshed out in an attempt to intimate that
differential wages should be allocated based upon participation in strikes.
115. S. REP. No. 111, supranote 10, at 15.

116. Id. at 28.
117. ATLESON, supra note 13, at 32-34. Professor Getman would describe this as-

sumption as a product of the "capitalist exemption." ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra
note 15, at 64. Getman describes this exemption as instances in which "the courts build in
the notion that it's the employer's property and use that notion to abrogate union rights."

Id.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), epitomizes the use of a priori notions of

management prerogative. In Lochner, the Supreme Court struck down a New York law
which prohibited the employment of bakery workers for more than 10 hours per day or 60

hours per week. The Court held that the law was not a health law, but instead an "illegal
interference with.the rights of individuals, both employers and employees, to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best, or which they may agree

upon with the other parties to such contracts." Id. at 61.
118. ATLESON, supra note 13, at 32.
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The doctrine also creates an irrebuttable presumption that
absent the prerogative of using permanent replacements, an employer would be effectively precluded from realizing its presumed right
to operate during a strike."' This irrebuttable presumption takes
the form of a failure, on the part of the courts, to consider whether
the offer of a permanent position was necessary in order for the
employer to attract sufficient numbers of workers to operate the
business during a strike. 2 ' Contrary to this irrebuttable presumption, the empirical evidence unequivocally demonstrates that an
employer may adequately run its operations during a strike with
only temporary replacements."' Overturning the Mackay doctrine
through passage of the Workplace Fairness Act will
end improper
122
judicial application of this inaccurate presumption.
II. CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT'S BEHAVIOR REGARDING
PERMANENT REPLACEMENT WORKERS

Prior to the 1980s, management usually chose not to operate
during a strike. To the extent that management would operate it
could usually meet its basic needs through the use of in-house per12 3
as a last resort, management chose to use replacements,
sonnel. If,
they would rarely use permanent replacements," and actually pre-

119. TransportationHearings, supra note 48, at 48; Weiler, supra note 15, at 391;
Hal Keith Gillespie, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity, 50 TEX. L.
REV. 782, 790 (1972) ("it has often been assumed that the carrot of permanency is
necessary if the employer is to acquire replacements").
120. For some examples of the failure of the courts to address the issue of whether
there was a legitimate business justification for offering replacements a permanent position instead of a temporary position, see Trans World Airlines v. Independent Fed'n of
Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375
(1967); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); NLRB v. DeltaMacon Brick and Tile Co., 943 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1991); Waterbury v. NLRB, 950 F.2d 849
(2nd Cir. 1991).
121. PERRY FT AL., supra note 94, at 51-68 (demonstrating that use of internal nonstriking personnel and temporary replacements are sufficient to run a plant during a
strike); see also infrapart UI.B.
122. Discussion of the evidence of an employer's ability to operate during strikes,
infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text, as well as how the unnecessary and persistent
use of permanent replacements illustrates managements increasingly blatant expression
of anti-union attitudes, will be developed below, see infra part III.
123. PERRY ET AL., supra note 94, at 63-66. "The hiring of replacements for
bargaining-unit employees.., was not an integral element in the operating plans of most
of the firms studied." Id. at 63; see also Gilespie, supranote 119, at 790-91.
124. PERRY ET AL., supra note 94, at 68. "Most [firms] continue to view the hiring of
outside replacements, particularlypermanent replacements, as an option to be exercised
only in unusual cases, and even then more with a view toward breaking an impasse than
breaking a strike." Id. (emphasis added).
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ferred temporary replacements. m Moreover,. management's ability
to attract sufficient numbers of temporary replacements was not
hindered2 6by its failure to offer these replacements a permanent
position.
However, starting in the early 1980s, management has manifested increasing hostility towards the very existence of organized
labor. In particular, management has tuned into Mackay Radio,
which otherwise had been standing essentially unused since its
birth in 1938. Accordingly, during the 1980s and early 1990s, management has increasingly used, threatened to use, and had the propensity to use permanent replacements, a drastic change from the
period7 prior to 1980 when use of permanent replacements was
rare.
A.

The Rare Use of PermanentReplacements Priorto the 1980s

A study conducted by the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business (Wharton Study) demonstrated that management reluctance to use permanent replacements was grounded in
two fears. First is the fear of failure, of management not being able
to run the plant during a strike, 12
' and second is the fear of confrontation with strikers, of violence on the picket line and long-lasting
animosity after a strike ended. 29 Additionally, "employers were
restrained by a desire to maintain an image as corporate 'good-citizens.'... Managers tended to have long-term ties to their community and would have had to live with the divisions that the use of
permanent replacements could cause."11°
Verifying the existence of these fears and finding methods to
3
dispel them was one of the primary goals of the Wharton Study.' 1
125. Id. at 64.
126. Id. at 64-65; see also infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
127. See S. REP. NO. 111, supra note 10, at 7-8; H.R. REP. NO. 57, supra note 10, at
14-15; Herbert R. Northrup, Foreword to CHARLES R. PERRY ET AL., supra note 94, at iiiiv; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: STRIKES AND

THE USE OF PERMANENT STRIKE REPLACEMENTS IN THE 1970S AND 1980s, H.R. Doc. No. 2,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE,

supranote 15, at 33-40.
128. PERRY ETAL., supra note 94, at 42.
129. Id. at 42-43.
130. S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 8; see also PERRY ET AL., supra note 94, at 1

("plant operation is not institutionally popular" because of consequences stemming from
resulting union antipathy).
131. PERRY ET AL., supra note 94, at 2-3, 37-40 (explaining the use and usefulness of

plant operation during a strike); id. at 42-43 (explaining that fears will be reduced
through planning).
The Wharton study seeks to enlighten the business community concerning the benefits of continued plant operation during a strike. It is possible that the study was
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The study determined that, to -the extent that some employers
planned for the use of replacements and ultimately used them, they
would lose their inhibiting fears and would become increasingly
"addicted" to the use of replacements." 2 Accordingly, the Wharton
Study effectuated its goal of reducing employer fears by teaching
management
how to rationalize plant operation during a strike. 3
For the purposes
of this article, the crucial point of the Wharton Study is that, almost 40 years after the Mackay doctrine was
established, plant operation during a strike was still a "relatively
new phenomenon," and the use of replacements in that context was
"rather unique,"3 4 as well as "difficult and unpopular."'3 5 The
authors concluded:
Although the right to operate during strikes provides employers with a
weapon to augment their right to take a strike in the conduct of collective
bargaining, to date that weapon has only seldom been used; it has not become a basic part of the American system of collective bargaining....
Plant operation is a departure from the norm in union-management relations. As such, it represents a clear escalation
of conflict and power by
136
management in its relationship with a union.
The Wharton Study does not stand alone in its conclusion. A
study released by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in January
of 1991 compared the perceptions of employers and union representatives, asking them if they believed replacements were hired less
often in the late 1970s than in the late 1980s.Y 7 The GAO reported
that "45 percent of the employers believe permanent replacements
were hired less often in the period 1975 to 1980 and about 77 percent of the union representatives believe they were hired less." 138
motivated, at least in part, by the funding sources which would benefit from this
research:
Research for [the Wharton study] was financed by generous grants from the J.
Howard Pew Freedom Trust in support of the Labor Relations and Public Policy
Series, by grants from the Gulf, Rollin M. Gerstacker and AO. Smith foundations, by Mobil Oil Corporation, and by membership contributions from the
ninety-five corporations that constitute the Industrial Research Unit's Research
Advisory Group.
Herbert R. Northrup, Foreword to PERRY ET AL., supra note 94, at v.
132. Id. at 41-43. "The records of the firms studied suggest that plant operation may
be addictive." Id. at 41.
133. Id. at app. (providing step-by-step guidelines on how to plan for continued plant
operation during a strike).
134. Herbert R. Northrup, Forewordto PERRY ETAL., supra note 94, at iii.
135. PERRY ETAL., supranote 94, at 125.
136. Id. at 123-24.
137. GAO REPORT, supra note 127, at 18.
138. Id.

19931

WORKPLACE FAIRTESS ACT

A study of strikes by Professor Cynthia Gramm also corroborates the Wharton Study.'39 Gramm stated:
I asked managers who indicated there had been past strikes involving the
same bargaining unit whether they had ever hired replacement workers
during past strikes. Every single manager said that this particular strike
was the first attempt to hire replacement workers. The strategy appears
to be a new experience for the firms in the sample. The incidence of this
strategy may be increasing relative to 'previous bargaining rounds. 140
The findings of these three studies and their similar conclusions
provide clear and compelling evidence that, prior to the 1980s, management rarely used permanent replacements during an economic
strike.
B.

The "Carrot"of Permanence is not Needed to Attract Sufficient
Numbers of Replacements

The Wharton Study determined that, to the extent that management would attempt to operate during a strike, it could do so
effectively with supervisors and non-union workers. 141 When management could not achieve a minimum operating level with just this
"in-house" help, temporary replacements offered an effective alternative. The Wharton Study confirmed that use of temporary replacements was preferred over permanent replacements prior to the
1980s.
The Wharton Study also found that, contrary to management's
expectations, temporary replacements were readily available. "All of
the firms that sought outside replacement labor reported surprising
success in that search in terms of the number of applications received and the number of applicants willing to cross a picket line to

139. ECONOmIC PoLIcY INsTITUTE, supra note 15, at 33-49. For further detailed discussion of Professor Gramm's study see infra notes 160-167 and accompanying text.
140. Id. at 34-35 (emphasis added).
141. PERRY ET AL, supra note 94, at 51-68. In a chapter entitled Logistics of
Operation:Manpower, Dr. Perry explains:
The most readily available supply of potential replacement workers willing
to cross a picket line to work a seven-day, twelve-hour schedule is a company's
own managerial and supervisory employees. This pool of labor generally is the
preferred and primary source of replacement labor among firms that operate
during strikes. In most of the companies studied, this pool has provided a sufficient, if not always ample, supply of labor to meet initial operating.
Id. at 54 (emphasis added); see also Gillespie, supra note 119, at 790-91.
142. PERRY ET AL., supra note 94, at 64. "Most of those firms... consciously avoided
the use of permanent replacements either by explicitly stating that they were hiring only
temporary replacements or by being silent on the subject of whether replacements were
temporary or permanent." Id.
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file applications, even when that was unnecessary."1 3 Indeed, there
appears to be no shortage of persons willing to provide help during a
strike, especially during the recessionary times of the early 1990s:
during a recent strike against the New York Daily News, the newspaper received 13,000 applications to replace the 3,000 striking
workers.144
Contemporary employment trends provide further support for
the contention that employers do not need to offer replacement
workers a permanent position. In the current labor market there is
an increasing use of temporary or casual labor.'4 As noted by the
United Auto Workers (UAW) in a prepared statement supporting
passage of the Workplace Fairness Act, the use of temporary employees is an accepted and expanding method of doing business:
A 1987 survey by the Administrative Management Society found that 90
percent of the companies surveyed used temporary help. According to the
major authority in this area, from 1980 to 1988 the temporary workforce
grew 175 percent from 400,000 to 1.1 million workers. If part-time and
other contingent workers are included, a conservative estimate puts the
overall contingent workforce at 29.9 million workers-roughly
25 percent
146
of the total civilian labor force of 121.7 million workers.
Since employers were able to effectively operate during strikes
prior to the 1980s without resorting to use of permanent replacements, and since the current labor market and contemporary employment trends indicate that employers have increased their use of
temporary workers, employers do not need to offer a permanent position in order to attract sufficient numbers of temporary replace143. Id. at 65. The study found that at least one firm preferred temporary over
permanent replacements because "turnover among these disdained classes of workers
[the permanent replacements] tended to be high in the months following the end of the
strike," due to harrassment. Id. at 66; see also Gillespie, supra note 119, at 790. Gillespie
notes that the Mackay doctrine "owes its firm entrenchment in the law to the lack of any
clear disproof of its assumption that employers must hire permanent replacements to protect and continue their businesses." Id. at 788.
144. Randall Samborn, Replacements Spur Labor Action, NAV'L L.J., May 28, 1990,
at 1. "The Daily News has received 13,000 applications to fill 3,000 union jobs, and 'that
does more to prevent a strike than create one,' [said] John Sloan, the newspaper's vice
president of human resources." Id.
145. Labor Comm. Hearings, supra note 3, at 209 (statement of Owen Bieber,
President, International Union, UAW).
146. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing RICHARD BELOUS, THE CONTINGENT EcONOmiY; THE
GROWTH OF THE TEMPORARY, PART TImE & SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE (National Plan-

ning Association 1989)). This conclusion is supported by evidence from other industrialized countries. In Canada, where use of permanent replacements is strictly limited or
prohibited, employers have not had difficulty in recruiting replacements. The Issue of
Strike Replacements: Hearingson H.R. 4552 Before the Subcomm. on Labor Management
Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, 67
(1988) (testimony of Canadian labor law scholar).
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ments. Instead, the facts clearly show that employers can adequately fill positions by offering prospective applicants only a temporary position. Depriving management of its Mackay doctrine
prerogative (use of permanent replacements) by passing the
Workplace Fairness Act will not significantly hinder management's
ability to run its operation during a strike.
C.

IncreasedActual and Threatened Use of Permanent
Replacements in the 1980s and Early 1990s

Results from four studies strongly suggest that use of permanent replacements has increased since the 1980s. 147 During 1990,
the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a
study entitled Strikes and the Use of PermanentStrike Replacements
in the 1970's and 1980's. The study relied principally upon two
sources: a questionnaire which ascertained the perceptions of management and union leaders,'8 and data furnished by the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). 149
The GAO findings demonstrate that use of permanent strike
replacements is no longer the rare phenomenon described by the
Wharton Study. 5 ' As a preliminary matter, the GAO found that
there was a 53% decline in the overall number of strikes in the
1980s as compared to the 1970s;15 ' the greatest decline (80%) occurred between 1979 and 1983 with 2,897 strikes in 1979 and only
647 strikes in 1983.152 In 31% of the strikes in 1985, and in 35% of
the strikes in 1989, employers threatened to use permanent re-

147. GAO REPORT, supra note 127; ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 15, at
33-40 (Gramm Study); DEP'T OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, A.F.L.-C.I.O., THE PERMANENT
REPLACEMENT OF WORKERS STRIKING OVER HEALTh CARE BENEFITS IN 1990 (1991); Labor

Comm. Hearings,supra note 3, at 218-21 (UAW survey); see also S. REP. NO. 111, supra
note 10, at 10-13; H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 10, at 17-20.
148. GAO REPORT, supra note 127, at 3, 18-20. In particular, the GAO relied upon
this source for an overall indication of perceived use of permanent replacement in the
1970s and 1980s. Id. The GAO's findings based on this data are discussed at infra notes
150-159 and accompanying text.
149. GAO REPORT, supra note 127, at 2, 12-18. In particular, data from the Federal

Mediation and Conciliation Service was used to ascertain information concerning the following: (1) the number of strikes in the 1970s and 1980s; (2) threatened use of permanent
replacements in 1985 and 1989; (3) when the threat occurred, i.e. before or after strike
started; (4) actual use of permanent replacements in 1985and 1989 as a percentage of the
total number of strikes; (5) duration of strike when permanent replacements were used;
(6) number of employees, as a percentage of the workforce, permanently replaced in 1985
and 1989; and (7) the comparative use of permanent replacements by small and large
firms. Id.
150. Herbert R. Northrup, Foreword to PERRY ET AL., supra note 94, at iii.
151. GAO REPORT, supra note 127, at 12.
152. Id.
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placements, 153 and employers actually hired permanent replacements in about 17% of all strikes in both years.'" The 17% figure
represents about 4% of the total number of strikers,' 5 s or 14,000 individuals.5 6
The GAO observed that its figures were probably lower than
the actual occurrences since the FMCS data only included strikes by
unions and employers covered by the NLRA. 5 7 Thus "strikes at
TWA, Continental, Alaska Airlines, Eastern, and other airlines in
which permanent replacements were hired, were not... included in
the GAO study."' "Continental Airlines hired permanent replacements in 1985 for over 8,000 striking pilots, machinists, and flight
attendants. And the Eastern Airlines dispute resulted in the permanent replacement of over 7,000 striking employees in 1989." 1 9
The GAO findings were confirmed by the Gramm study. 6 '
Gramm conducted two random samplings of strikes, one in New
York State and the other nationwide.' 6' She found that in about 16%
of the strikes in the U.S. sample, employers used permanent replacements during their last strike." 2 In the New York sample,
about 24% of employers had used permanent replacements. 6 3 She
also found that use of temporary replacements was less frequent: 6%
in the U.S. sample and 10% in the New York sample.'6 Gramm concluded that "employers seem to be using permanent replacements
more frequently than temporary replacements as an operating
strategy during strikes."6 1 This conclusion was buttressed by the
statements of employers who used permanent replacements, all of

153. Id. at 13.
154. Id. at 15-18. The GAO also found that in both years the use of permanent
replacements was 96% in units of less than 1,000 workers. Id. at 18.
155. Id. at 17-18. The GAO offered at least two explanations for the differential
between the 17% figure (total strikes) and the 4% figure (total striking workers): (1) a
strike in which only one person was permanently replaced counted the same as one in
which all strikers were replaced, id. at 17; and (2) small strikes (i.e., less than 1,000
workers), which accounted for 96% of all strikes involving permanent replacements,
counted the same as large strikes, id. at 18.
156. Id. at 17.
157. Id. at 2 n.3.
158. S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 10-11; GAO REPORT, supranote 127, at 2 n.3.
159. S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 11.
160. ECONOMIc POLICY INSTITUTE, supranote 15, at 33-40.
161. ECONOMIC POLICY INsTrrTE, supra note 15, at 33. Professor Gramm studied 35
strikes across the country and 21 strikes in New York State, compiling her data from surveys of managers who were involved in those strikes. Id.
162. Id,
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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whom told Gramm it had been their first experience.'6 Based on
these findings, and their contrast to the findings of the Wharton
Study concerning use of replacements prior to the 1980s, Gramm
concluded that "employer willingness to hire permanent replacements has increased during the 1980s." 167

'

Additional evidence of increased use of permanent replacements since the 1980s is found in an AFL-CIO Department of Employee Benefits study. The study examined major strikes (1,000
workers or more) reported to the FMCS in 1990 in which permanent
replacements were hired.6' The survey found that 243,300 workers
participated in these large strikes in 1990 and approximately 11%
(26,450) were permanently replaced. 169 The study also indicated that
55% of all strikes were prompted by labor-management disputes in
which the employer was demanding health care benefits concessions
from the union; 707 in those strikes 69% of the workers were permanently replaced.'

1

Finally, a 1991 UAW study corroborates the increasing use of
permanent replacements. The UAW survey queried international
UAW staff field representatives from across the country about the
actual use and threatened use of permanent replacements in their
jurisdiction since the mid-1980s. 172 There were forty-two reported
instances in which some form of replacements was used: twentyseven of these companies used perimanent replacements, six companies used3 temporary replacements, one used both, and eight did not
specify.17

The UAW study also demonstrated that the mere threat of
permanent replacements can have a devastating effect on union
166. Id. at 34-35.
167. EcoNoMic POLIcY INsTrrTTE, supra note 15, at 35. Gramm's conclusions
regarding the increased tendency of employers to use permanent replacements was
verified by a survey conducted by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA). The BNA found
that 82% of the employers surveyed, if struck in 1991, would consider replacing workers if
they went on strike, Strike Breaking, 59 ECON. NOTES (Lab. Res. Ass'n), Jan.-Feb. 1991,
at 1, 2, up from the 73% that expressed such attitudes in 1986, DEP'T OF EMPLOYEE

BENEFITS, A.F.L.-C.I.O., supra note 147, at 4.
168. DEP'T OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, A.F.L.-C.I.O., supra note 147, at 2. The study
used data collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and from a phone survey of the
unions named therein. Id. Of the 51 strikes reported, they contacted union
representatives involved in 48 of them. Id. See also AFL-CIO Study Indicates Increase in
Permanent Replacement of Strikers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 114, at A-3 (June 13,
1991), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, DLABRT File.
169. DEPT. OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, A.F.L.-C.I.O., supra note 147, at 5.
170. Id. at 3. The report also noted that the majority of services reported rendered by
FMCS were over health care issues. Id.
171. Id. at 2.
172. Labor Comm. Hearings,supranote 3, at 218-21.
173. Id. at 218.
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bargaining leverage or the attempt to organize new units. 174 Of the
twenty-four cases in which threats were made before, during or after
collective bargaining began, twenty-one of the union representatives
reported accepting concessions or working without a contract. 7 ' Out
of the twenty-one instances in which a threat was issued during an
fourteen cases and
organizing drive, the union was defeated in
176
abandoned the organizing drive in two others.
The findings of the GAO study, the Gramm report, the AFLCIO study, and the UAW survey are essentially consistent. All four
studies found that management has been increasingly more apt to
use permanent replacements in response to an economic strike dur174. The 1991-92 dispute between the UAW and Caterpillar, Inc. (CAT), demonstrates that the mere threat of permanent replacement may have a significant impact on
the balance of power between labor and management. On November 4, 1991, UAW
workers employed by CAT, a large multi-national agricultural equipment manufacturer,
voted to begin a limited strike of 2,000 workers. Auto Workers LaunchesLimited Strike at
Two CaterpillarInc. Plants in Illinois, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 214, at A-3 (Nov. 6,
1991), availablein LEXIS, BNA Libraiy, DLABRT File. The critical issue separating the
UAW and CAT was whether the new contract would be patterned after a recently
executed contract between the UAW and Deere & Company. Caterpillar,UAW Meet under the Auspices of FMCS, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at A-16 (Apr. 14, 1992),
available in LEXIS, BNA Library, DLABRT File [hereinafter Auspices of FMCS].
Accordingly, the UAW sought $40,000 as top pay for senior skilled craftsmen at the plant
in 1994, as was achieved in the Deere & Co. contract, while CAT proposed top pay of
$39,000. Jonathan P. Hicks, UnionAgrees to End Strike at Caterpillar,N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
15, 1992, at A-1. By April 2, 1992, five months after the strike's inception, it had
expanded to include 12,600 strikers. CaterpillarAsks Strikers Back; UAW Authorizes
More Strikes, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 64, at A-A (Apr. 2, 1992), available in LEXIS,
BNA Library, DLABRT File.
In this context, CAT issued an ultimatum to the union: either the strikers return to
work by April 6, or CAT would begin hiring permanent replacements. Id. At this critical
juncture, President Bush did not favor any federal involvement in the dispute. Bush Sees
No Role for Government in Caterpillar-UAWContractDispute, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
71, at A-13 (Apr. 13, 1992), available in LEIS, BNA Library, DLABRT File. Nevertheless, both parties agreed to meet with the Director of the FMCS, Bernard DeLury, to seek
a mediated settlement on April 13 and 14. Auspices of FMCS, supra, at A-16. At the conclusion of the mediation, the UAW agreed to end the strike and ultimately accepted CAT's
last offer, even though it represented a break from a long tradition of patterned collective
bargaining agreements. CaterpillarNegotiations May Resume Next Week, FMCS Says,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 74, at A-10 (Apr. 16, 1992), available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
DLABRT File; Hicks, supra, at A-i; Robert L. Rose, UAWAgrees to End Strike at Caterpillar,WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1992, at A-3.
The CAT strike demonstrates that an employer need not use permanent replacements to adversely affect a union worker's statutory right to strike. The mere threat of
permanent replacement is a powerful weapon in the hands of management. In. the UAWCAT dispute, it was a major factor causing the union to give up its quest for a patterned
agreement, notwithstanding the fact that such agreements had been the industry
standard in UAW contracts for decades prior to the dispute.
175. Labor Comm. Hearings,supra note 3, at 219, 221.
176. Id, at 219.
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ing the 1980s and early 1990s. Given the contrary findings of the
Wharton Study, which analyzed management practices prior to the
1980s, the conclusion that management has increasingly used,
threatened to use, and had the propensity to use permanent replacements since the 1980s is substantiated. Management's use of
permanent replacements, the devastating effects permanent replacements have on unions, and -the fact that employers can adequately fill positions with temporary employees, indicate an increasingly hostile management disposition towards the existence of
organized labor.
III. CONSTRUING MANAGEMENT'S ATTITUDINAL EMBOLDENMENT
Examination of recent interaction between management and
unions evidences management's increasingly blatant hostility towards the existence of unions and the collective bargaining process.
Various theories have attempted to trace the roots of this attitudinal
emboldenment to historical material foundations. One explanation
posits that "[u]nions find themselves dealing increasingly with conglomerates and multinational corporations that can more easily
weather economic struggles ...than could their predecessor counterparts." 1 With this trend towards conglomeration, employers may
feel better equipped economically to take a powerful stance against
unions. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources has
offered its own hypothesis:
Since 1981, there has been a wave of mergers and leveraged buyouts in
this country, along with a distorted focus on short-term performance.
Many corporate managers-overloaded with debt and in possession of new
companies with which they have had no long-term relationship-have
tended to regard workers as mere assets to be used and discarded. Because they have just taken over an enterprise, these new employers have

no sense of commitment to their newly acquired workforce or to the local
community. Frequently, their interest in short-term returns leads them to

ignore or even sacrifice long-term employee interests by getting rid of a
loyal, experienced workforce....

178

The argument concludes that this so-called "new breed of employer'
does not hesitate to replace permanently a union workforce." 79
Notwithstanding various theories that have attempted to trace
177. Atleson, supra note 108, at 842.
178. S.REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 14.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30 for a discussion of the Committee's
findings that prior to the 1980s permanent replacements may not have been used due to a
concern for maintaining a positive public image, and because managers had long-term
ties to their community and would have had to live with the divisions caused by using
permanent replacements.
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the roots of management's bolder expression of anti-union attitudes-a full discussion of which is not within the scope of this
article-management's hostility towards labor has now become so
potent as to be considered an independent force, affecting the dynamics of labor-management relations, and becoming an integral
element in arguments justifying the need for the Workplace Fairness Act. While passage of the--Workplace Fairness Act may not
change management's attitude, it can help to limit the scope of
management's expression of anti-union attitudes and thereby
effectuate the promise of the NLRA.'180
A.

The Non-Necessity of Permanent Replacements and Their
DevastatingAnti- Union Effect Expose Managements'Attitudes

The evidence establishes that employers can adequately fill positions by offering prospective replacements temporary positions,
and that depriving management of its Mackay doctrine prerogative
will not devastate management's ability to run its operation during
a strike.'' Additionally, the evidence unequivocally demonstrates
that use of permanent replacements devastates unions, entrenches
conflict, and harms labor-management relations. 82 Nevertheless
management has increased its use of permanent replacements since
the 1980s and has denied any anti-union animus in doing so.' 83 Is it
possible that notwithstanding the multitude of devastating effects
management's use of permanent replacements perpetuates against
unions, its increased use of them is innocent?
According to James P. Melican, Senior Vice-President and General Counsel of International Paper Co., management's use of permanent replacements is innocent: that is, management's purpose is
180. See supra notes 12-33 and accompanying text (describing the intent of the
Congress in enacting the NLRA). Evidence suggests that other countries may have
somewhat successfully controlled the aggressive expression of anti-union attitudes, For
example, in Canada, the ethos and traditions of labor-management relations may be quite
different compared to the United States. A study conducted by Professor Atleson
compared attitudes and legal structures in Canada and the United States: "American employers have shifted to a more militant posture including fervent opposition to union organization, greater assertiveness in bargaining and strategies in personnel relations to
blunt the attractiveness of unionism to employees. In Canada, on the other hand, union
acceptance generally exists among large Canadian firms." James B. Atleson, The Role of
Law and Union Organizing- Thoughts on the United States and Canada (Sept. 1991)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Buffalo School of Law, CanadianAmerican Legal Studies Program). See generally CHARLES J. MORRIS, AMERICAN LABOR
POLIcY 406-11 (1987) (suggesting that management could benefit by a less hostile and aggressive stance toward labor).
181. See supra part II.B.
182. See supra part I.B.1.
183. See supra part II.B-C.
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not to bust unions.' s4 However, if this were true, then the following
impacts would merely be coincidental side effects, completely unrelated to any underlying intention to destroy the union: (1) the
undermined integrity of the union as a viable bargaining representative;"" (2) the enhanced likelihood that the union will be decertifled;18 6 (3) the decreased likelihood that management will have to
settle with the union;18 7 (4) the increased likelihood that a union will
make concessions;"" (5) the weakening of unions by protracting
strikes; 8 9 (6) the increased chance that a union organizing drive will
be unsuccessful; 190 and finally (7) shifting the resolution of a given
union's representational status away from NLRB determination and
into the private hands of management.' 9 '
The assertion of Workplace Fairness Act opponents that use of
permanent replacements is merely an innocent resort to just another
possible economic weapon in the process of jockeying for position at the
collective bargaining table is disingenuous at best. Even if management
does not use permanent replacements for the purpose of breaking
unions, it is highly likely that they are at least aware of the devastating
effects their use brings to bear on unions. In this context, management's
needless use of permanent replacements, with its simultaneous
awareness that such practices devastate unions, hardly supports a
claim of innocence. 2 Whether it be purposeful use, knowing use, or
184. Miller, supra note 9 ("Industry opponents of the legislation, not surprisingly,

deny that hiring of permanent striker replacements is motivated by union busting."); see
also Labor Comm. Hearings, supra note 3, at 119-20 (statement of Thomas C. Foley,
business owner employing 7,000 workers, claiming that use of permanent replacements
was most viable alternative to keep company running); id. at 139 (statement of Peter G.
Nash claiming that resort to permanent replacements is "part and parcel of the free economic interplay which the NLRA was designed to foster").
185. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
188. See supranote 55 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
190. See supranotes 174-76 and accompanying text.
191. See supranotes 51-56 and accompanying text.
192. In criminal law, a defendant may be culpable for causing the death of another
individual even if the defendant did not purposely cause the death of the victim. One
criminal statute in New York provides, among other things, that "a person is guilty of
manslaughter in the first degree when:... [bleing eighteen years old or more and with
intent to cause physical injury to a person .... the defendant recklessly engages in conduct which... causes the death of such person." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney
1990) (emphasis added). Reckless conduct does not require that a person act with the
"conscious objective .. .[of] caus[ing] the [unlawful] result"; instead it merely requires
that the defendant "is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that such result will occur." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (McKinney 1990).
Thus if one applies the standards of culpability used in criminal law to an employer's
use of permanent replacements, an employer's claim of innocence is not effective. If the
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even reckless use of permanent replacements, the increasingly blatant
expression of managements anti-union attitudes are forcefully implicated.
However, even if we were to take employers at their word and
assume that their use of permanent replacements is completely innocent, and further assume that they are oblivious to the devastating effects noted above, their denial of specific intent is irrelevant
under an analysis guided by the principles of the NLRA. 193 Section 7
of the NLRA created a statutory right to "engage in ... concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining." 94 This right is
further protected by section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, which provides
that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7."195 Under the dictates of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, it
is not necessary to find anti-union animus in order to deem the employer's conduct an unfair labor practice. 9 ' In this regard the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp. noted:
[Sipecific evidence of... subjective intent is "not an indispensable element of proof of violation." "Some conduct may by its very nature contain
the implications of the required intent; the natural foreseeable consequences of certain action may warrant the inference.... The existence of
discrimination may at times be inferred by the
Board, for 'it is permissible
19
to draw on experience in factual inquiries.'"'
employer merely consciously disregardedthe substantial risk that use of permanent replacements would devastate unions, such awareness, in and of itself, would be sufficient
to constitute a culpable mental state under criminal law standards. Thus, an employer's
use of permanent replacements cannot be considered an innocent act even if management
did not do so solely for the purpose of destroying unions.
193. NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
194. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (emphasis added).
195. NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
196. In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp,, 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963), the Supreme Court
held that an employer's offer of super-seniority to striker replacements and strikers
choosing to return to work was so inherently destructive of the right to strike that the
scheme was deemed an unfair labor practice regardless of the employer's intent. See also
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967) (limiting the rule in Erie
Resistor by balancing the harm to the union against the employer's business interest in
taking the action); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378-80 (1967) (holding
that, absent proof of legitimate and substantial business justifications, an employer's refusal to reinstate strikers when vacancies occurred was an unfair labor practice
irrespective of the employer's intent in refusing reinstatement); Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB,
414 F.2d 99, 106 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that employer's threat to deny employment
"forever" if employees went on strike, and subsequent refusal to reinstate after the strike
ended were unfair labor practices irrespective of the employer's actual intent), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
197. 373 U.S. at 227 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Later in the Erie
Resistor opinion the court reiterated that it was not necessary to find specific intent for
certain classes of employer activities:
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The ruling in Erie Resistor, eliminating the need to prove
employer intent, was limited four years later in NLRB v. Great.Dane
Trailers,Inc. 9 ' In Great Dane, the Supreme Court added the following proviso to the Erie Resistor rule: "[I1f the adverse effect of the
discriminatory conduct on employee rights is 'comparatively slight,'
an antiunion motivation must be proved to sustain the charge if the
employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct."'9 9
Erie Resistor and Great Dane construe section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA so as to arguably render use of permanent replacements an
unfair labor practice. Permanent replacements have devastating
effects on unions,0 0 and the business justification for their use is
minimal.2"' Whether or not management denies discriminatory intent in using permanent replacements is actually irrelevant to an
analysis under section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA since intent is not
necessary to find the employer's conduct an unfair labor practice.
Notwithstanding management's state-of-mind, use of permanent replacements constitutes an unfair labor practice, in addition to evidencing an escalation in anti-union conduct. Since the Supreme
Court refuses to overrule the Mackay doctrine and has in fact
expanded its application, passage of the Workplace Fairness Act is
necessary to compel the courts to find an employer's use of permanent replacements exactly what it is-an unfair labor practice.
B.

CollateralEvidence FurtherIllustratingManagement's
IncreasinglyHostile Attitude Towards Unions

-

Simultaneous with its expanded use of permanent replacements, management has increasingly resorted to other collateral
practices which corroborate the presence of aggressive anti-union
attitudes. In the 1980s, employers expanded their use of unfair labor
practices (ULP). In fact, the number of ULP charges "has more than
doubled, from below 10,000 each year in the 1960s, to above 20,000
each year in the 1980S."202
The outcome may well be the same when intent is founded upon the inherently
discriminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself. The employer in such
cases must be held to intend the very consequences which foreseeably and inescapably flow from -his actions and if he fails to explain away, to justify or to
characterize his actions as something different than they appear on their face,
an unfair labor practice charge is made out.
Id. at 228.
198. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
199. Id at 34.
200. See suprapart I.B.1 and H.C.
201. See suprapart II.B.
202. ECONOMvIC PoLicy INSTITUTE, supra note 15, at 14 (citing statistics from the
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Even more indicative of management's increasingly hostile
disposition is the fact that the percentage and number of ULP cases
deemed meritorious has risen significantly: 'From 1946 to 1977,
roughly 70 percent of cases were withdrawn or dismissed. For most
of the 1980s, only 60 percent were so treated."2 3 Moreover, twice in
the 1980s the number of workers reinstated by court or NLRB order
as a result of successful ULP suits by workers for discriminatory
discharge reached 10,000 workers or more; in contrast, between
1946 and 1980 that number only reached 6,000 twice.2 04
The relevance of management's resort to unfair labor practices
is more significant than the harm to specific individuals. Data indicates that an employer is actually rewarded by its illegal conduct. In
particular, where employers engage in such illegal activities, the
chance of a union successfully organizing a new unit is only seventeen percent, while in the absence of such employer misconduct, the
rate of success increases to an average of forty-seven percent.0 5
ULPs also "diminish by one third the likelihood that a union will
actually secure a first contract."2 6 These collateral developments,
NLRB indicating a general rise in the incidence of ULPs). The statistics cited by the Institute separately document the incidence of discriminatory discharge cases. Id. at 15-16.
They also document resolution of ULPs by methods of disposition, id. at 14-15, by the
number of employees in the workplace, id. at 14, and by the median length of time required to resolve the case, id. at 16-17.
203. Id. at 15 (citation omitted); see also Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing
Worker's Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1778-81
(1983) (discussing statistics which reveal that the number of ULPs filed has increased,
and the rate at which they are deemed meritorious has risen from 29.1% in 1960 to 399
in 1980).
204. ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 15, at 16.

205. William Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on CertificationElections:
Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560, 572-73 (1983). The

projections proffered by Dickens were derived through computer simulations from statistics compiled in 1976, id. at 560, 571-73, and his results are corroborated by a General
Accounting Office (GAO) study, id. at 560 (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
CONCERNS REGARDING IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE CHARGES AGAINST EMPLOYERS FOR UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICES, H.R. DOC. NO. 80, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982)).

206. Weiler, supra note 15, at 357. "In light of this evidence, the troubling decline of
collective bargaining in the private sector must be attributed in large part to the
astonishing increase in employers' use of illegal tactics to resist union representation of
their employees." Id. The problem is further exacerbated by delays in processing of ULP
charges. The NLRB takes more than 700 days to process a charge, while in Canada the
processing rate is only 120-180 days. ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 15, at 16
(citing statistics from the NLRB and Peter G. Bruce, The Processing of Unfair Labor
Practice Cases in the United States and Ontario, 45 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 481

(1990)). A study by the GAO revealed that the median processing times were at the highest level in agency history during the years 1984-89. GAO Urges Labor Board to Adopt
Time Targets, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 193, at A-A (Oct. 4, 1990), available in LEXIS,
BNA Library, DLABRT File. Moreover, nearly one in five cases took more than two years
to decide. Id.
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occurring simultaneously with management's significantly increased
use of permanent replacements, strongly supports the argument
that management's claims of innocent intent are prevarications at
best.
IV. CONCLUSION

Management has increasingly used permanent replacements
since the 1980s, and when management uses such replacements the
union is frequently devastated. Simultaneous with the increased use
of permanent replacements and its devastating impact on unions,
management has also increasingly resorted to other unfair labor
practices. The rate at which ULP suits have been deemed meritorious is at its highest point in the history of the NLRA, and the evidence shows that management's resort to unfair labor practices
sabotages a union's ability to function effectively. The parallel development of management's increased use of permanent replacements and resort to unfair labor practices since the 1980s, and the
devastating impact both practices have on unions are not mere coincidences. Indeed, each time management uses permanent replacements, resorts to unfair labor practices, and disregards the devastation inflicted on unions, management's aggressive anti-union attitudes are revealed.
Regardless of the roots of this attitudinal emboldenment, the
harmful effects of bold anti-union attitudes have become a significant force in and of themselves. Consequently, the creative drive of
management and its anti-union consultants to find new ways to
circumvent their obligation to deal with unions will proceed unrelentingly until a "union free environment" is achieved. 0 7 A Senate
Committee Report assessing the merits of the Workplace Fairness
Act elaborated on this point:
Given the cumulative changes in the legal rules, as well as the changes in
the economic climate and employer attitudes, the committee concludes
207. Thomas Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. commented on the
increasingly prevalent use of anti-union consultants:
[There has been the creation] since sometime in the mid-1970s ... of an entire
industry, an entire army, of labor-management consultants who are peddling
their wares to employers and encouraging them to exist in a "union-free environment," a phrase trumpeted by the largest association of employers in the
United States. That's what contributes to a bad climate-the [National Association of Manufacturersl] "union-free" campaign....
Labor Comm. Hearings, supra note 3, at 31. This view is supported by Dickens, supra
note 206, at 563-65. Anti-union consultants have published books which outline how to
plan extensively and run anti-union campaigns. See generally ROBERT LEWIS & WiLIA
A. KRUPMAN, WINNING NLRB ELEcTIoNs: MANAGEMENT STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE
PROGRAzS (1979).
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that, without a change in applicable Federal law, the increased use of
barpermanent replacements will continue, and the survival of collective
208
gaining in the private sector of the economy hangs in the balance.

As a counter measure, the Workplace Fairness Act cannot
change management's attitudes. However, it would function to
remove at least one of the means by which management may
legitimately give effect to its increasingly bold anti-union attitudes
and forcefully limit the range of possibilities which can be creatively
devised to break unions. 20 9 Finally, passage of the Workplace
Fairness Act would help to assure the legitimate place of unions in
this society and thus enhance and effectuate the promise of the
NLRA.

208. S. REP. No. 111, supra note 10, at 16.
209. One author has proposed the following as a compromise means of safeguarding
against such anti-union intent:
[E]ven if it were true that some employers on some occasions have to promise
permanent jobs in order to recruit the people they need to operate their plant,
the current rule is overinclusive because it allows all employers to do
so .... [Thus alt a minimum . .. the law should be changed to require an
employer to prove that it actually needed to promise permanent tenure to
replacements in order to maintain operations before permitting such a serious
inroad on the Section 7 rights of striking employees.
PAUL C. WEmER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 267 (1990) (footnote omitted). See generally
id. at 264-69; Gillespie, supra note 119, at 795; Alan Hyde, A Theory of LaborLegislation,
38 BuFF. L. REv. 383, 437 (1990) (discussing that "perceived worker unrest helps set the
legislative process into motion").

